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MILTON R. GOFF, individually and 
as trustee of MILTON R. GOFF 
TRUST, an unincorporated 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case And Course of Proceedings. 
Respondents, Paul H. Richins ("Richins"), Richtron, Inc. 
("Richtron, Inc."), Richtron Financial Corporation ("Richtron 
Financial11) , and Richtron General ("Richtron General") 
(collectively, the "Richins Parties") accept generally the 
statement of the case set forth by petitioner, John P. Sampson 
("Sampson"). However, the proper determination of Sampson's 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI 
(Priority No. 13) 
Supreme Court No. 89014 6 
petition for writ of certiorari (the "Petition") requires Sampsonfs 
statement to be clarified and supplemented in two important 
respects. 
First, as Sampson accurately states, the original complaint 
in this case was filed in the name of Robert J. Osborn for the 
ostensible purpose of enforcing in the State of Utah a judgment 
obtained by Osborn (the "Osborn Judgment") against the Richins 
Parties in the State of Oregon. However, Sampson fails to state 
that the Osborn Judgment was one of the many litigation matters for 
which the Richins Parties retained Sampson to protect their 
interests (R. 2079, 2083; Exhibits 64 and 67); that rather than 
negotiating a compromised settlement of the Osborn Judgment as 
requested by the Richins Parties, Sampson purchased in his own name 
the Osborn Judgment for the purpose of bringing suit against his 
former clients, the Richins Parties (R. 2050-51, 2058-59) ; that 
after the Richins Parties were served with the summons and 
complaint in this case, they learned from Osborn that he had 
previously sold the Osborn Judgment to Sampson and asserted no 
further interest in the judgment (R. 2051); that upon discovering 
that fact, the Richins Parties moved to dismiss the action on the 
basis that it was not being persecuted in the name of the real 
party in interest Id. ; that in response to that motion, Sampson 
admitted that he had acquired the Osborn Judgment and was indeed 
the real party in interest Id.; and, that the primary purpose for 
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which Sampson purchased the Osborn Judgment was to preserve claims 
against his former clients in his ongoing efforts to take control 
of the twenty-five limited partnerships in which either Richtron, 
Inc. or Richtron General was the sole general partner 
(collectively, the "Limited Partnerships11) (R. 2058-59). 
In addition, it is important to understand that during the 
summer of 1982, Sampson was in frequent contact with the United 
States Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS") for the purpose of 
providing it with information regarding the internal structure and 
business affairs of his former clients, the Richins Parties. 
(Exhibits 298 and 300). With that assistance, the IRS conducted 
a public auction in October, 1982 to sell a number of assets of the 
Richtron Companies. (R. 2125-26) . Sampson, appearing on behalf 
of several investors in the Limited Partnerships, submitted the 
highest bid and thereby apparently1 acquired substantially all of 
the assets of the Richtron Companies. Id. Shortly thereafter, 
Sampson issued a threat to the Richins Parties1 legal counsel that 
unless counsel permanently ceased his representation, Sampson would 
seek "sanctions" and unspecified "other" relief against him. (R. 
2131-32, 2231-32). The district court concluded that Sampson's 
1
 After the IRS sale, the Richins Parties sought and obtained 
from the United States District Court for the District of Utah an 
order voiding the sale on the grounds that the IRS failed to comply 
with several requirements governing the sale of the taxpayerfs 
assets. 
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threat was "bizarre" and constituted "unprofessional conduct." Id. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
Contrary to Sampson's assertion that his conduct was 
undertaken in "good faith" and involved only "technical 
violations", See Petition at 18, the factual record upon which the 
trial court based the Judgment and upon which the Court of Appeals 
affirmed it establishes something completely different: a 
calculated scheme, ". . . one of greed and a vendetta to oust 
Richins [from the Limited Partnerships] and take complete control." 
(R. 2159; Finding No. 93). The general contours of Sampson!s 
intentional interference with the Richins Parties1 contractual 
relations as general partners of the Limited Partnerships is set 
forth below. 
1. Sampsonfs initial interference with the Richins Parties1 
management and control of the Limited Partnerships. 
On May 29, 1980, Richins conducted a meeting of the Catlow 
Valley Farms Limited Partnership at which many of the limited 
partners were in attendance. (R. 2103, 2107-08). Sampson, who was 
retained by two of the limited partners to evaluate their interests 
in that partnership, also attended the meeting. (R. 2076-77). 
After Richins informed those in attendance that two judgments 
(including the Osborn Judgment) had recently been entered against 
the Richins Parties, Sampson began sowing the seeds of investor 
discontent: 
4 
His [Sampson's] actions there were a bit more 
than just privately counseling his two clients, 
for he not only recommended to those at the 
meeting and got started the movement to have 
Richtron Financial file for bankruptcy under 
chapter 11 proceedings, but he also expressed 
the legal opinion to all present that he did 
not think Richtron Financial could keep the 
mark-up equity arising from Richtron 
Financial's resale of the farm property to the 
Catlow Valley Partnership for an amount in 
excess of what it paid for it, which was a 
theme which Sampson repeatedly [and 
erroneously] expressed in the months and years 
ahead. 
(R. 2076-77). 
As shown below, Sampson used this meeting as a springboard to 
launch his assault on the interests of the Richins Parties and 
gradually seize control of the Limited Partnerships. 
2. Sampson's tenure as legal counsel for the Richins Parties 
and his betrayal of their trust. 
At a Limited Partnership meeting on June 26, 1980, Sampson and 
two of his clients agreed to purchase the capital stock of the 
Richtron Companies for $700,000. (R. 2078). At that time, Richins 
informed Sampson that he anticipated that several creditors would 
be filing lawsuits against the Richtron Companies in the near 
future. (R. 2078-79) . Sampson instructed Richins to send him any 
such complaints and told Richins that he ". . . would answer and 
stall them off." Id. Pursuant to that understanding, Sampson 
". . . soon became involved in handling certain legal matters for 
Richins and his companies." (R. 2079). Specifically, Sampson 
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agreed to represent the Richins Parties and protect their interests 
in at least fourteen separate matters. (R. 2079-83) . After 
agreeing to answer and otherwise take care of those litigation 
matters, Sampson failed to do so, thereby allowing at least five 
cases to result in the entry of default judgments against the 
Richins Parties. (R. 2081). 
Notably, one of the matters in which Sampson agreed to assist 
the Richins Parties was negotiating a compromised settlement of the 
Osborn Judgment. In that regard, Sampson participated with Richins 
in seeking to negotiate a settlement of Osbornfs claim during a 
meeting on July 1, 1980. (R. 2079). While the district court 
found that the ". . . certainty of the existence of any 
attorney/client relation between Sampson and Richins during 
discussions with . . . Osborn. . . is by no means clear,11 R. 2079, 
the record is undisputed that one of the files that Mr. Gillette 
turned over to Sampson for Sampson's attention in August, 1980 was 
the Osborn file. (R. 2083; Exhibits 64 and 67). That was 
consistent with Richins1 understanding. (Exhibit 118). 
In evaluating the extent to which Sampson's conduct deviated 
from the standard of care customarily imposed upon lawyers in the 
representation of their clients, the district court concluded that: 
Sampson's acceptance of the representation of 
defendants in various lawsuits as set forth in 
the findings and his failure to answer or 
otherwise respond, or to take steps for 
defendants to obtain other counsel and thereby 
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avoid defaults, constituted negligence and a 
failure to measure up to the standard of care 
to be expected of members of the legal 
profession. 
(R. 2209). 
3. Sampson's solicitation, receipt and wrongful retention 
of capital contributions and crop proceeds. 
Beginning in late June, 1980, some of the limited partners 
insisted, and Richins consented, that Sampson serve as the initial 
repository of capital contributions. (R. 2112). That mechanism 
was put in place to insure some degree of control over how the 
funds were spent. Id. (R. 2150) . Importantly, Sampson was in all 
instances to ". . . pass the funds through to Richins for payment 
of pressing obligations" of the Limited Partnerships. (R. 2112). 
In classic understatement, the district court observed: 
That plan was not followed to the letter and 
Sampson began placing and retaining partner 
contributions in his trust accounts at his 
bank, and particularly so when the settlement 
agreement [between the Richins Parties and the 
limited partners] was not approved. 
(R. 2150). Indeed, the extent to which Sampson deviated from the 
"letter" of the agreement is staggering: from June 27, 1980 to 
October 29, 1984, he solicited and received approximately 
$1,522,000.00 of capital contributions and proceeds derived from 
the sale of crops cultivated on the Limited Partnerships' 
properties. (R. 2265) . Richins repeatedly made demand on Sampson 
to comply with the original agreement by relinquishing the proceeds 
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to the Richtron Companies that were then (and, as the district 
court concluded, always had been) the sole general partner of the 
Limited Partnerships. (R. 2056, 2226; Exhibits 54, 147, 161, 162, 
163, 179, 182, 184, 188, 195, 196, 198, 204, 206, 209). 
4. Sampson's repeated efforts to stop the Richins Parties 
from being repaid loan advances. 
In early June, 1980, Sampson informed numerous limited 
partners that the Richins Parties were not entitled to the 
repayment of any loan advances they had previously made to the 
Limited Partnerships. (R. 2100-01, 2148). He "repeatedly" 
reiterated that statement "both orally and in letters." (R. 2148). 
The amount of those advances exceeded $300,000.00. (R. 2100). As 
a result of Sampson's statements, the limited partners refused to 
consent to the Limited Partnerships' repayment of the loan advances 
to the Richins Parties. (R. 2110-2112). 
Another important result of Sampson's statements regarding 
repayment of advances was to prevent consummation of an early 
settlement of the Limited Partnerships' affairs. (R. 2112-13). 
In the words of the district court: 
A major stumbling block [to settlement] was the 
insistence of a few partners that nothing 
should be paid to Richins which factor, I 
believe, and so find, was based in part upon 
Sampson's early and repeated statements that 
the partnerships were not obligated to repay 
advances. Id. 
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5. Sampson floods the limited partners with letters 
criticizing the Richins Parties and urging that limited partners 
to insert his corporations as general partner. 
By early December, 1980, the long hoped-for settlement between 
the Richins Parties and the limited partners had fallen through. 
(R. 2112) . At that point, Sampson prepared and sent to all of the 
limited partners of the Limited Partnerships a letter dated 
December 2, 1980. (R. 2119-20; Exhibit 7). That letter sets forth 
in astonishing detail and with almost palpable rage, a plan that 
Sampson and several of the limited partners had conceived to wrest 
control of the Limited Partnerships from the Richtron Companies. 
In that letter, Sampson made a number of inflammatory and 
ultimately destructive recommendations to all of the limited 
partners.2 Among those recommendations was that the investors 
refuse to settle with the Richins Parties; that the investors not 
pay any monies to the Richins Parties; that the investors stop 
payment on any checks previously issued to the Richins Parties; 
that the investors sue the Richins Parties for fraud and breach of 
fiduciary duty; that the investors send all further monies to 
Sampson, and not the Richins Parties; that the investors consent 
It is important to recall that Sampson represented only 2 
of the 130 investors in the Limited Partnerships. (R. 2142). As 
the district court concluded with apparent exasperation, Sampson 
"never fully specifically identified11 any of the additional clients 
whom he purportedly represented. (R. 2159). 
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to Sampson inserting his professional corporation as successor 
general partner of the Limited Partnerships; that the investors 
give their voting proxies to Sampson; and, that the investors pay 
substantial compensation to Sampson. Id. 
During the next three years, Sampson sent numerous letters to 
the investors in which he denigrated the Richins Parties and sought 
to obtain investor support for his plan to seize control of the 
Limited Partnerships. In so doing, Sampson ". . . had for all 
practical purposes reduced Richins1 control in partnership affairs 
to a letter writing role." (R. 2161). 
6. Sampson's acquisition of the Osborn Judgment. 
Immediately after sending the December 2, 1980 letter, Sampson 
contacted Osborn and Osbornfs legal counsel for the purpose of 
buying the Osborn Judgment. (R. 2050). Those discussions resulted 
in a January, 1981 agreement whereby Osborn agreed to sell the 
Osborn Judgment to Sampson for $40,000.00, $20,000.00 of which was 
to be paid immediately and the balance of which was to be paid 
within three months. Id. Accordingly, on January 23, 1981, 
Sampson sent a check in the amount of $20,000.00 to Osbornfs legal 
counsel. Id. Several days later, counsel transmitted to Sampson 
an assignment of the Osborn Judgment that recited on its face that 
in consideration of the sum of $40,000.00, Osborn assigned to 
Sampson personally all of his right, title and interest in and to 
the Osborn Judgment. (R. 2 050-52). In a cover letter accompanying 
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that assignment, Osborn1s counsel wished Sampson "good luck on your 
proceedings against the [Richins Parties]," (Exhibit 17). For 
obvious reasons, Sampson did not inform the Richins Parties of that 
acquisition. (R. 2051). 
Both the initial $20,000.00 (and the additional $45,000.00 
that Sampson later paid to Osborn after Sampson defaulted in his 
payment of the required initial installments) were derived from 
monies paid to Sampson by investors in the Limited Partnerships. 
(R. 2050). Sampsonfs admitted purpose for acquiring the Osborn 
Judgment was for to preserve and assert a claim against the Richins 
Parties by bringing an action thereon. (R. 2059, 2203). 
Accordingly, the district court concluded that Sampson's purchase 
of the Osborn Judgment violated Utah Code Ann., §78-51-27, which 
prohibits a lawyer from acquiring a ". . . demand of any kind for 
the purpose of bringing an action thereon. . ." (R. 2202-3). It 
further concluded that Sampson's dual violations of that statute 
were "a serious violation of law." (R. 2124). 
7. Sampson's cooperation with the IRS as an additional 
vehicle for dismembering the Richins Parties. 
During 1982, and while simultaneously pursuing the conduct 
described above, Sampson also communicated freely with the IRS in 
seeking to assist it in identifying and describing various assets 
owned by his former clients, the Richtron Companies. (Exhibits 298 
and 300). 
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Shortly thereafter, on October 29, 1982, the IRS conducted a 
public auction for the purpose of seeking to sell the various 
assets of the Richtron Companies. (R. 2125-26). Sampson, as the 
only bidder at that sale, purported to acquire the Richtron 
Affiliates1 assets. Id.3 
8. Sampsonfs ongoing solicitation and use of monies from 
some of the limited partners of the Limited Partnerships. 
From June, 1980 to November, 1982 (just after the IRS sale at 
which Sampson purported to acquire whatever interest the Richtron 
Companies had in the Limited Partnerships), Sampson solicited, 
received and disbursed lf. . .at least $645,000.00 from and for the 
limited partners and their partnerships." (R. 2123). In doing so, 
he directed the investors to send the monies to ". . . him and not 
to Richins." Id.4 From November, 1982 to October, 1984, Sampson 
received an additional $900,000.00, resulting in total receipts for 
the four and one-half year period of approximately $1,522,000.00. 
(R. 2265). Thus, during that period of time, " . . . Sampson had 
As indicated at n. 1, supra, that sale was, at the instance 
of the Richins Parties, later voided by the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah. 
4
 Indeed, Sampson's solicitation of monies from investors in 
the Limited Partnerships was shockingly direct. For example in 
a letter dated January 7, 1981 sent to all investors, Sampson 
stated: ". . . since we are now taking over all of the 
partnerships would you please make all those payments [assessments 
previously made by the Richtron Companies] to me." Exhibit 183. 
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taken over and assumed control of the twenty-five partnerships, 
and he was receiving all of the funds, disbursing them and using 
them in whatever way he determined. He continued such control for 
five years, yet produced no evidence as to what had happened to 
those partnerships." (R. 2158). His use of those partnership 
funds was determined by the district court to be "unauthorized" 
because the Richtron Companies " . . . remained general partner with 
complete control over partnership affairs." (R. 2236). So long 
as Sampson failed to lawfully install his corporations as successor 
general partner of the Limited Partnerships, he had "no legal 
authority to make such decisions regarding partnership assets." 
(R. 2056). 
Notably, from the moment the federal court voided the IRS tax 
sale on May 16, 1984 (R. 2157), the legal ability of Sampson and 
his limited partner clients to undertake any further efforts to 
wind upon the affairs of any of the Limited Partnerships " . . . 
ended then and there." (R. 2231). However, even after the entry 
of that order, the two bank accounts which he controlled — the Ag-
Management account and the Consolidated Farms account — had a 
balance of approximately $289,000.00. (R. 2229, 2244, 2263, 2276). 
That amount, all of which legally belonged to Richtron, Inc. and 
Richtron General, is greater than the amount of consequential 
damages awarded to Richtron, Inc. and Richtron General. (R. 2278) . 
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9. Sampsonfs concealment of his predatory conduct, 
Sampson boasted in a letter sent to all investors that he had 
creatively concealed from the Richins Parties — his own former 
clients — the financial information necessary to trace his use of 
the Limited Partnerships1 funds: 
I wanted him [Richins] to spend all his time 
occupied at doing something, trying to figure 
out what we had done, I have always known that 
if he went through the proper procedures in 
court he could get the information. I simply 
wanted him to spend all his time and money to 
do it. (Exhibit 88). 
Co General Overview of Case. 
The district court cogently summarized its decision as 
follows: 
The record in summary thus shows that in May, 
1980, Richins and his companies had control of 
at least twenty-five limited farm partnerships 
with assets and liabilities of such a nature 
that they had serious financial problems in 
May, 1980, when Sampson first became involved. 
It further shows that when Sampson first got 
involved he had nothing in the twenty-five 
partnerships except two clients that wanted 
advice. By Sampson's act and conduct by the 
end of 1980 — within seven months — Sampson 
had taken over and assumed control of the 
twenty-five partnerships, disbursing them and 
using them in whatever way he determined. 
Sampson suggested from time to time that his 
sole objective was to salvage the partnership 
assets for the limited partners to the point 
of at least getting back their investments. 
The evidence does not show that all investors 
joined in retaining Sampson as their attorney 
or their proxy, but the evidence does make 
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clear that Sampson's main goal and effort soon 
became one of getting rid of Richins from all 
partnerships and obtaining control thereof for 
himself and his clients whom he never fully 
specifically identified. I think the evidence 
shows, and so find, that his self-declared 
benevolent motive soon changed to one of greed 
and a vendetta to oust Richins and take 
complete control. 
As floundering as the partnerships were, 
Sampson saw value there and spent what now 
totals six years in achieving what he now has, 
whatever it may be, leaving Richins and his 
companies with no tangible assets or values. 
(R. 2158-59, 2275) (Emphasis added). 
ARGUMENT I 
In Affirming The District Court's Judgment, The 
Court of Appeals Faithfully And Methodically 
Applied The Principles And Rationales Of Leigh 
Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom 
Sampson asserts in the Petition that the Court of Appeals1 
decision is erroneous for three reasons: (i) the "majority" of the 
acts performed by Sampson, and on which the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the Judgment, do not constitute "improper means" within 
the meaning of this Court's decision in Leigh Furniture and Carpet 
Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982), (ii) the Court of Appeals 
failed to recognize that ". . . a lack [of] good faith is a prima 
facie element for a plaintiff to establish to show certain actions 
are indeed ximproper'" and (iii) the element of a defendant's "good 
faith" is not the functional equivalent of the affirmative defense 
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of privilege. (Petition at 12, 13). Those assertions are, 
however, belied by both the factual record relied upon by the 
district court in entering the Judgment and by a fair reading of 
Leigh Furniture. 
A. The Factual Record Establishes, and the Court of Appeals1 
Decision Identifies, a Wide Array of Intentional Interference and 
Improper Means of Contract Interference by Sampson. 
Sampson's conduct, as set forth in pp. 2-15, above and in pp. 
9-11 of the Court of Appeals1 decision, is clearly intentional. 
When aggregated, it constitutes a pattern of unlawful conduct 
crossing the tf. . . threshold beyond what is incidental and 
justifiable to what is tortious." 657 P.2d at 306. Indeed, 
Sampsonfs four year pattern of tortious activity was accomplished 
through conduct far more serious and pervasive than those found to 
be actionable in Leigh Furniture. 
B. Neither Leigh Furniture nor the Cases on which it is 
Based Requires a Plaintiff to Establish a Defendant's Lack of Good 
Faith as a Separate Element of a Plaintiff's Prime Facie Case. 
There are at least three separate reasons why there is no 
merit to Sampson's claim that the Richins Parties must establish 
his lack of good faith as an additional element of their prima 
facie case. First, the presence or absence of "good faith" is 
relevant only to the element of improper purpose enunciated by 
Leigh Furniture. It is not an additional element to be engrafted 
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on the improper means prong of the tort. To the extent the Richins 
Parties established at least one improper means to effectuate 
Sampson's intentional interference, Sampson cannot insulate himself 
from liability by claiming that those means were undertaken in 
"good faith." All that Leigh Furniture requires, and all that the 
Court of Appeals1 decision held, was that once an intentional 
interference accomplished by an improper means is established, the 
state of mind of the defendant is, from the standpoint of the 
plaintiff's prima facie case, unnecessary to establish liability. 
Second, the cumulative effect of Sampson's deployment of 
multiple means of contract interference makes any finding of good 
faith factually impossible. Sampson's purchase of the Osborn 
Judgment for the primary purpose of preserving and asserting claims 
against his former clients (R. 2058-59) ; his unethical disclosure 
to the IRS of his former client's business assets and subsequent 
purchase of those assets at the sale (R. 2125-260; his purposeful 
and wrongful solicitation, receipt and retention of investor 
capital contributions and crop proceeds (R. 2150) and; his 
subsequent efforts to conceal the extent of his tortious conduct, 
See Exhibit 88, to name a few, militate strongly against any 
finding of good faith. 
Finally, Sampson's citation to the district court's Findings 
setting forth his supposed absence of bad faith, See Petition at 
15, is misleading in that the findings relate solely to the court's 
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decision not to award punitive damages. These findings obviously 
conflict with the court's earlier findings that Sampson's conduct 
was actuated by "greed" and a "vendetta to oust Richins," R. 2159 
and by a ". . . desire to do harm to the Richins Parties for its 
own sake," Id. But, as the Court of Appeals' decision properly 
noted, the conflict normally would be resolved by resort to the 
underlying record. Decision at 16. Sampson's failure to provide 
that record, however, precludes that inquiry. 
C. The Issue of a Defendant's Supposed Good Faith 
Constitutes a Claim of Legal Privilege Which Must be Raised as an 
Affirmative Defense. 
Sampson's reliance on a standard of "good faith" is nothing 
more than an assertion that he was legally privileged to carry out 
the conduct that he did. However, he failed to plead privilege as 
an affirmative defense in his reply to the Richins Parties' second 
amended counterclaim. (R. 1656-63) . That failure, of course, 
constitutes a waiver of the affirmative defense, See Utah R. Civ. 
P., 12(h) and cannot now be raised for the first time on appeal. 
Manger v. Davis, 619 P.2d 687 (Utah 1980). 
Thus, the Court of Appeals' decision suffers from none of the 
defects which Sampson ascribes to it. The Petition accordingly 
must be denied. 
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ARGUMENT II 
The Court of Appeals Properly Affirmed The 
District Court's Damage Award 
In seeking to challenge the Court of Appeals1 affirmance of 
the district court's damage award of $250,000s, Sampson argues that 
the Court of Appeals ". . . took an incredible leap and essentially 
wrote its own Findings of Fact as to what the $250,000 was based 
on." Brief at 21. The Court did no such thing. 
The district court expressly found and concluded that the date 
on which the federal district court voided the IRS tax sale on 
which Sampson based his claim of interest in the Limited 
Partnerships — May 16, 1984 — "ended then and there" Sampson's 
right to take " . . . any further steps in the winding up of any 
affairs of the partnerships in which the Richtron Companies 
remained as general partner." (R. 2231). The court then observed 
that despite the entry of that order, Sampson "undauntingly"6 
continued from that point to collect and receive additional limited 
partner monies which, as of October 29, 1984 (the last day for 
which the Richins Parties were able to obtain Sampson's accounting 
It is important to note that the Petition does not seek 
this Court's review of the propriety of three other components of 
damages: (i) $30,974.50 to Richtron Financial (ii) $4,222.50 to 
Richtron, Inc. and (iii) $2,027.40 to Richins. 
6
 R. 2276. 
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records) totalled $288,597.00 — $245,597.00 of which were 
contained in the Consolidated Farms account and $43,000.00 of which 
were contained in the Ag Management account. (R. 2229, 2263, 
2276). Significantly, Sampson's use of the Limited Partnerships' 
funds was determined by the district court to be "unauthorized" 
because the Richtron Companies . . ."remained general partner with 
complete control over partnerships' affairs." (R. 2236). Thus, 
"Sampson had no authority to make decisions regarding partnership 
assets." (R. 2056) . 
Immediately after rendering its conclusions regarding 
Sampson's unlawful collection and retention of the $288,597.00 
after the federal court order was entered, the court concluded that 
the Richins Parties had established damages "of at least a 
consequential nature" that had been established with ". . . a 
reasonable degree of certainty by a preponderance of the evidence." 
(R. 2276). 
Therefore, in fixing the Richins Parties' damages at 
$250,000.00, the court had before it an eminently certain basis for 
fixing those damages — the aggregate amount of all monies 
collected and retained by Sampson after entry and in violation of 
the federal court order. Thus, the $250,000.00 damage award 
suffers from none of the lack of precision of which Sampson 
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complains. It has an abundantly "rational basis11 in the record as 
required by Utah law7. As such it cannot be overturned. 
That result is not altered by Sampson's argument that an 
appellate court cannot " . . . create a factual finding which does 
not exist." (Petition at 22). The Court of Appeals merely 
interpreted the district court's specific, detailed findings 
respecting Sampson's legally unauthorized retention of Limited 
Partnerships' funds in the amount of $289,000 as an obvious basis 
for supporting its conclusion that Sampson's contract interference 
had damaged the Richins Parties in the amount of at least $250,000. 
That the Court of Appeals had authority to do so has been 
repeatedly recognized by this Court. Peterson v. Peterson, 64 5 
P. 2d 37 (Utah 1982)8 (Court confirmed an alimony award on a basis 
considered by neither the court nor any of the parties — the 
enactment of a statute controlling the respondent's entitlement to 
an award of alimony); Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, 595 P.2d 860 
(Utah 1979); ("Under the rules of appellate review, we affirm the 
trial court if we can do so on any proper ground even if the court 
below assigned an incorrect reason for its ruling."); Foss Lewis 
7
 Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah 1983); Winsness 
v. M. J. Conoco Distributors, 593 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1979). 
8
 Sampson's present counsel served as co-counsel for the 
unsuccessful appellant in that case. 
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& Sons Construction Company v. General Insurance Company of 
America, 30 Utah 2d 290, 517 P.2d 539, 540 (1973) ("whether or not 
the judge gave the correct reason for his ruling is of no 
importance, since he should be affirmed if he reaches the correct 
result."). 
The Court of Appeals1 faithful adherence to this salutary 
principle of appellate review requires no correction by writ of 
certiorari. 
CONCLUSION 
Neither of the arguments contained in the Petition has any 
substantive merit; neither presents the type of issue required or 
suggested by Rule 43, Supreme Court Rules. Therefore, the Petition 
should be denied. 
DATED this X<o day of April, 1989. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
^<\^U^ 
JOHI^ T. ANDERSON 
Attorneys for Cross-Appellants 
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